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Abstract—Industry 4.0 considers integration of IT and control
systems with physical objects, software, sensors and connec-
tivity in order to optimize manufacturing processes. It pro-
vides advanced functionalities in control and communication
for an infrastructure that handles multiple tasks in various
locations automatically. Automatic actions require information
from trustworthy sources. Thus, this work is focused on how
to ensure trustworthy communication from the edge devices
to the back-end infrastructure. We derive a meta-model based
on RAMI 4.0, which is used to describe an end-to-end com-
munication use case for an Industry 4.0 application scenario
and to identify dependabilities in case of security challenges.
Furthermore, we evaluate secure messaging protocols and the
integration of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as a root of trust
for data-exchange. We define a set of representative measurable
metrics based on existing standards and use them for automated
dependability detection within the whole system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the world is facing a new technological revolu-
tion known as Industry 4.0, which will also affect economies
and societies worldwide [1]. The novel concept Industry 4.0
addresses the challenges of the 4th industrial revolution based
on the logic of Cyber Physical Production Systems (CPPS) by
decentralizing intelligence for independent processes and gen-
erating networking, which self-optimize, communicate with
each other and optimize the production as a whole [2], [3].
The advanced features of Industry 4.0 bring new challenges in
terms of design and security. RAMI4.0 [4] provides a reference
architecture where the elements of assets are described based
on a three axes layer model. Based on this reference model,
we derive a CPPS meta-model to have a clear view on the
complexity of these systems and to show the inter-domain
security related dependabilities and affected components.
In the manufacturing environments, automation systems
continue to become part of globally connected systems, mean-
ing that intrusion attempts will increase and non-authorized
access to information may also create a risk for the pro-
duction process. Since CPPS are a fast-evolving field, where
new vulnerabilities are constantly emerging due to security
breaches in the cyber domain, the successful infiltration in
these systems can directly impact industrial and manufacturing
environments. Consequences can be in different areas or
dimensions, such as interruption of an operation, modification
of an operational process or sabotage with intention to cause
harm. Manipulating or interrupting such systems could also
affect safety in the CPPS, which can have consequences such
as environmental damage, injury or loss of life.
Therefore, to maximize uptime and agility, secure end-
to-end communication is required. It is important that data
validation and security trust boundaries are applied to critical
sections of the system, which require monitoring to provide
higher level of transparency. Due to these trust boundaries
between for example, different stakeholders, service level
agreements (SLA) should be in place.
Thus, only an improved overall security concept considering
the dependability between these aspects can address this
challenge and provide trustworthy communication in CPPS.
To address this, we evaluate the communication of the system
from the edge devices (i.e., industrial device) to the backend
infrastructure (i.e., cloud platform). We evaluate secure mes-
saging protocols and investigate the possibility of integrating
TPM as a root of trust for the CPPS components [5]. Further,
we define a set of metrics for the CPPS components and map
them to the corresponding objects of the meta-model. To make
sure that the system is secured and the information can be
trusted, measurable and automated dependabilities are needed
to monitor security. By monitoring the measurable metrics we
will extend our previous work [6] to address security in CPPS
with a special focus on trustworthy end-to-end communication
in Industry 4.0. Our main contributions and preliminary results
in this position paper are:
• deriving a CPPS meta-model based on RAMI 4.0
• evaluating secure messaging protocols and proposing
TPM as a root of trust for secure data exchange
• defining a representative set of measurable metrics
• using the CPPS meta-model for describing the proposed
end-to-end communication use case and for showing the
dependabilities between CPPS components
The remainder of the paper follows the same structure as the
contributions above.
II. RELATED WORK
This section gives an overview of existing state-of-the art
work for CPPS relevant activities. First, we give an overview
of existing architectural models. Second, we evaluate different
secure messaging protocols and we consider the scientific
work and relevant activities addressing transparency from
the edge devices to the backend infrastructures related to
operational security, legal and safety aspects.
A. Industry 4.0 Architectural Models
RAMI 4.0 – Reference Architectural Model Industry 4.0
describes the key elements of an object/asset based upon the
use of a layer model consisting of three axes: (i) Architecture
axis, (ii) Process axis, and (iii) Hierarchy axis. It consists of
an Administration Shell which is a virtual representation of
the real assets and gives information about the status of the
assets and data during their lifetime [4].
IIRA – The Industrial Internet Reference Architecture is a
standards-based open architecture under the Industrial Internet
Consortium (IIC) for designing Industrial Internet Systems
(IIS). Based on ISO/IEC 42010 standard specifications for
complex systems with multiple components and multiple in-
terconnected systems, the IIRA defines what are the most im-
portant industrial internet architecture components, their con-
nections and categorize the IIS concerns on four viewpoints:
implementation, functional, usage and business viewpoint [7].
To support the understanding of complex systems, such
as CPPS, a meta-model based on RAMI4.0 requirements is
derived. The CPPS meta-model shown in Fig 1 is an example
usage of RAMI4.0, which can be easily adopted and scaled to
the needs of Industry 4.0 application scenarios.
B. Secure Messaging Protocols
MQTT1 – Message Queue Telemetry Transport is an OA-
SIS standardized protocol designed to be lightweight, flexi-
ble and simple to implement. MQTT uses different routing
mechanisms, such as one-to-one, one-to-many or many-to-
many, making possible the connection for IoT and M2M
devices/applications. MQTT is a publish/subscribe messaging
transport protocol on the top of TCP/IP protocol consisting of
3 components (subscriber, publisher, and broker). To define se-
curity, MQTT uses user/password authentication and SSL/TLS
for secure data communication. In terms of Quality of Service
(QoS), it supports three levels: (i) 0 - the message will be
delivered once, with no confirmation, (ii) 1 - the message
will be delivered at least once, with confirmation, (iii) 2 - the
message will be delivered exactly once by using a handshake.
AMQP2 – Advanced Message Queuing Protocol is a bi-
nary application layer protocol standardized from ISO/IEC
19464. It is a message centric protocol on top of TCP/IP,
which provides publish-subscribe and point-to-point commu-
nication. AMQP supports message-oriented communication
via message-delivery guarantees including: (i) at-most-once,
1www.mqtt.org
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when the message is delivered once or never, (ii) at-least-one,
when the message is delivered and (iii) exactly-one, when
the message will certainly delivered only once. It provides
different features, including routing and storing messages
within the broker using message queues. In terms of security,
it supports SASL authentication and TLS for secure data
communication.
CoAP3 – Constrained Application Protocol is a web transfer
protocol which supports unicast and multicast requests for use
in constrained devices and networks. It is based on a request-
response architecture between endpoints. CoAP clients after
sending the requests using an URI, can receive as a response
GET, PUT, POST and DELETE resources from the server. The
messages are exchanged over UDP between endpoints and also
it supports the use of unicast and multicast requests. CoAP
provides security via the DTLS, a secure protocol for network
traffic which supports handling packet loss and reordering of
messages. In terms of QoS, CoAP provides two levels: (i)
’confirmable’ when no packet is lost and the receiver respond
with an ACK; and (ii) ’nonconfirmable’ when the message do
not require an ACK.
XMPP4 – Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol is a
TCP communication protocol based on Extensible Markup
Language (XML) used for real-time messaging, online pres-
ence and request-response services. Clients communicate via
a distributed network and do not rely on a central broker.
XMPP supports publish/subscribe model and provides security
such as authentication via SASL and secure communication
via TLS but does not provide any level of QoS.
DDS5 – Data Distribution Service is based on a publish-
subscribe principle, which provides real-time and high per-
formance data communication. DDS uses a bus to connect the
publishers and subscribers by providing a set of QoS policies
(e.g., data availability, data delivery, data timeliness, resource
usage, etc). In terms of security, each device/application has
to assure its own security.
The main focus of messaging systems is to guarantee the
delivery, routing and storage of the information without the
necessity of implementing different mechanisms. Different
standard organizations (i.e., W3C, IETF, EPCglobal, IEEE
and ETSI) have been created to provide secure messaging
protocols for the IoT. Based on these standards and relevant
scientific works [8], [9], we have compared MQTT and
CoAP (shown in table I) as the most suitable communication
protocols with respect to security of industrial devices, Indus-
trial IoT (IIoT) components and cloud services in Industry
4.0. applications. Even though they are both designed for
use on lightweight environments, they have different funda-
mentals and fields of applications. MQTT uses TCP, which
requires less resources consumption than UDP. Also it has a
publish/subscribe communication model, whereas CoAP uses
an asynchronous communication model. This communication
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model offers to MQTT several benefits, such as Time De-
coupling where the nodes publish their information regardless
of other nodes state. The QoS, another important aspect in
Industry 4.0, is provided in 2 levels from CoAP and in 3
levels from MQTT.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF MQTT AND COAP PROTOCOLS
Furthermore, MQTT supports 16 types of messages, while
CoAP supports only 4 types. Another important feature of
MQTT is the Last Will and Testament (LWT) used to inform
other clients about an unexpected disconnected client. In
terms of security CoAP supports DTLS and MQTT supports
SSL/TLS, which are protocols used for secure communication.
C. Relevant Activities in CPPS
FITMAN (Future Internet Technologies for Manufacturing
Industries) project has the goal to integrate future internet
technologies into manufacturing industries. With achieving
this, FITMAN wants to make easier the adoption of FI PPP
(Future Internet Public Private Partnership) technologies in EU
industries by giving more access to advanced IT solutions.
Also, it proposes a dynamic decision model that integrates
performance metrics to monitor the performance of service
oriented systems in order to ensure their sustainability [10].
The focus of the project is on providing solutions for im-
proving the efficiency of business processes and enabling
interoperability, rather than addressing security and safety
of internet technologies when integrated in manufacturing
industries.
ARROWHEAD6 focus is to find methods to enable collabo-
rative automation by networked embedded devices [11]. The
project targets five application domains: (i) smart production,
(ii) smart buildings and infrastructure, (iii) electro mobility,
(iv) smart energy, and (v) virtual market of energy. One
of the main outputs of the project is the ARROWHEAD
framework, which is based on a service oriented architecture
(SOA) technology, and offers interoperability between IoT
and CPS devices at a service level. In order to provide
adequate security and safety levels for such a framework to
function properly, services such as, authorization, authenti-
cation, certificate distribution, security logging and service
intrusion are considered as well. Even though the focus of the
project is to provide interoperability between devices using
the ARROWHEAD framework and to integrate automation
systems in these devices, security and safety aspects are also
6www.arrowhead.eu
considered. However legal (e.g., SLAs) aspects are not in the
focus of the project.
CyPhERS7 (Cyber-Physical EU Roadmap Strategy) project
combines and expands EU competences in embedded, mobile
computing and in control of networked embedded systems.
The main objective is to provide a systematic overview of
the technology trends and innovation associated with CPS
by providing conclusions concerning the priority areas for
research and action with surveys and analysis of the economic,
technical, scientific, and societal significance of CPS. This
project identifies the research and innovation challenges for
EU competences in the field of CPS by choosing the fields
of action and expanding with suggestions for actions in the
specific field. The project has identified a set of research and
innovation challenges related to legal aspects for the CPS to
ensure trustworthiness. It also considers dependability of the
CPS systems as an important challenge, but the focus of the
project is to provide recommendations rather than to provide
security, legal or safety solutions for the CPS.
CPSoS (Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems) project has the
main goal to establish the state-of-the-art and future research
challenges in the area of CPSoS by providing a roadmap on
research and innovation priorities in engineering and man-
agement of CPSoS. Also, it provides a platform for related
projects and communities with the main goal to define a EU
research and innovation agenda on the challenges of System
of Systems (SoS) in which computing and communication
interact with complex physical systems [12]. The project has
summarized the most important challenges in engineering and
management of CPS and has proposed 11 topics on which
should be the focus during 2016-2025, but without addressing
legal or safety issues in these systems.
Road2CPS8 project is a coordination and support action
focused on identifying and developing opportunities for novel
technologies, applications and services in the field of CPS, by
identifying solutions to problems associated with it and the
socio-economic issues accompanying these innovative changes
through roadmaps. Road2CPS has published an e-book where
are summarized all the findings of the project including the
roadmap and the recommendations for the deployment of CPS.
The project considers security, legal and safety issues, but the
focus is on providing recommendations for strategic actions
required for the future development of CPS. Thus, they do
not address specifically the issues by for example, providing
controls or measurable metrics.
AMASS (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless
Assurance and Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems) 9
project aims on developing a holistic approach for assur-
ance and certification of CPS by considering safety, security,
availability, robustness and reliability with the main goal to
reduce time, costs and risks for assurance certification. Thus,
even though the focus of the project is safety assurance and
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certification, the main goal is to reduce time, costs and risk
for certification. Security of CPS is also considered, but legal
(e.g., SLAs) aspects are not in the focus of the project.
SAFURE10 (Safety and Security By Design For Intercon-
nected Mixed-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems) aims at devel-
oping a framework for CPS by implementing a methodology
to assure safety and security by construction. The SAFURE
framework is a collection of architectural concepts, functional
building blocks, modelling approaches, analysis methods and
tools based on Common Criteria. The project analyzes safety
and security but with more focus on interoperability within and
between critical systems. They do not address legal aspects.
NGCert (The Next Generation Certification) project has
proposed a dynamic certification approach that adopts the
common certification process to the increased flexibility and
dynamics of cloud computing, based on a new semi-automated
certification process and the continuous monitoring of critical
parameters of cloud services [13]. To support the autonomic
validation of these parameters, an approach using low level
metrics of IaaS components is proposed. NGCert project
addresses security, legal and organizational issues under the
scope of cloud computing, without considering cyber physical
devices or the communication between both.
Cumulus (The Certification Infrastructure for Multi-Layer
Cloud Services) project has addressed security, privacy, and
compliance issues by developing an integrated framework of
models, processes and tools supporting the certification of
security and assurance in the cloud [14]. They also address
security and engineering models for CPS [15]. The project
relies on multiple types of evidence regarding security, in-
cluding service testing and monitoring data and trusted com-
puting proofs, and is based on models for hybrid, incremental
and multi-layer security certification. CUMULUS addresses
security certification for service users, service providers and
cloud suppliers. They also consider legal aspects and safety
but focused only on the cloud.
SECCRIT11 (Secure Cloud computing for Critical infrastruc-
ture IT) project has analyzed and evaluated cloud computing
technologies addressing security risks in sensitive environ-
ments. The project has developed methodologies and best
practices including risk assessment, policy specification and
assurance evaluation for critical infrastructure. In order to
achieve these goals, SECCRIT has identified and established
legal challenges to provide evidence and data protection for
cloud services; methodologies and tools for risk assessment;
best practices for secure cloud implementations including a
cloud assurance evaluation methodology to aggregate and
simplify monitoring information related to high level security
properties. SECCRIT project addresses operational security
and legal issues for critical infrastructure providers who want
to migrate their services in the cloud, thus the focus is only
on the backend infrastructure.
10www.safure.eu
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The approaches and frameworks developed as part of the
above projects address trustworthiness based on the edge
devices or the backend infrastructure without considering the
whole system. Projects such as NGCert, Cumulus, CTP and
SECCRIT provide best practices and solution for transparency
but with focus entirely on the cloud. Other projects, such as
MORE, AMASS and SAFURE consider safety and security
on the edge devices without considering the whole system.
Furthermore, BEinCPPS, CyPhERS, CPSoS, and Road2CPS
provide evaluations of the current state of the art related to
CPS with the main goal in priority areas for research and
action. The goal of this work is to achieve CPPS transparency
and trustworthiness in security by considering the cloud and
the edge devices as highly networked systems, incorporating
large numbers of IT systems and automation components. We
consider security as not independent from other issues such as
legal and safety and we will enhance our previous work [6] to
address security in the CPPS with a special focus on secure
end-to-end communication in Industry 4.0.
III. THE CPPS META-MODEL
Taking the RAMI 4.0 requirements into account, we derive
a CPPS meta-model to model all relevant entities of these
systems and their dependabilities on different levels. Using the
ADOxx tool and UML notation is implemented a combination
of both diagram types, Class and Object Diagram, illustrated in
Fig 1. This meta-model aims to describe Industry 4.0 scenarios
and to identify the dependability of components in case of
security issues. The CPPS meta-model consists of five levels
and the corresponding components:
The Business / Governance level aims to aggregate the
business and governance view on the CPPS. Core element
within this aggregation is the Process that provides a direct or
indirect contribution to the value chain of an organization and
has a defined starting and end point. Other objects within this
level include:
• Product: products are sales units with a certain price
• IT Service: the provision of one or more technical systems
to enable or support a business process
• Requirements: represents a technical requirement with
respect to one or more architecture elements
• Contract/Agreement: service level agreements (SLAs)
The Architecture&Service level is composed of:
• Application Group: a logical grouping of applications
• Application: describes operational software from a func-
tional point of view
• Application Component: a modular, interchangeable, and
installable component of an application
• Service: a well-defined and business-oriented functional-
ity that supports business processes
• Interface: allows communication between applications
and/or application components
• Data: different types of structured or unstructured data
or information within an organisation
The Technology level has the following objects:
Fig. 1. The CPPS meta model composed of five main levels and the corresponding objects, used to describe an end-to-end communication use case for an
Industry 4.0 application scenario
• Technology Package: different technology products
• Technology: product consisting of hardware or software
• Infrastructure Component: a resource, usually a server or
cluster, on which applications, application components,
or databases are installed and then run
• Database: data storage in which business objects can be
managed in a structured manner
• Network Element: the interface between infrastructure
modules or between spatially separated networks
The Organisation level contains:
• Role: functions carried out by one or several persons
• Actor: a concrete person who can assume responsibility
• Organisational Unit: independent unit of an organisation
characterized by its own resources
• Site: geographic location of components
The Risk Architecture level groups the objects:
• Risk: a critical situation of the specific environment
• Safety/Security: strategies to prevent risk
Each of the above-mentioned components has a set of
attributes that describes the characteristic features of the
underlying CPPS. In context of this work, the meta-model
is used as a tool: (i) to map an end-to-end communication
use case for an Industry 4.0 application scenario presented
in section IV-A, and (ii) to see the dependability between
the CPPS components presented in section IV-C. The derived
meta-model can be easily adopted and scaled to the needs of
Industry 4.0 application scenarios. As different use cases and
viewpoints should be considered and researched, the chosen
meta-model allows incremental enhancements that can be
proven by research activities in the CPPS.
IV. SECURITY IN CPPS
The CPPS are a fast-evolving field where new vulnerabil-
ities are constantly emerging due to security breaches in the
cyber domain. These vulnerabilities can be exploited by attack-
ers with a wide spectrum of motivations ranging from criminal
intents aimed at financial gain to industrial espionage, and
cyber-sabotage. For instance, the Dragonfly attack [16], is a
type of cyber-espionage attack against energy suppliers, which
could have caused damage or disruption to the energy supply
in the affected countries. This assumption is consistent with the
concern that the physical processes/systems of CPPS become
increasingly more susceptible to the security vulnerabilities
of the cyber domain, as the interaction between the physical
world and the cyber world increases in Industry 4.0. Therefore,
ensuring security is of utmost importance, since any disruption
or outage of CPPS can severely affect not only the physical
processes being controlled but also the people who depend on
them [17]. Towards this direction, a security baseline for CPPS
is essential to be identified. To this end, different existing
standards and best practices guidelines, such as NIST SP
800-series or ISO/IEC 270xx series, have to be evaluated.
These existing standards and guidelines are expected to be
used in several aspects of CPPS environments so as to ensure
secure interconnection of production systems and production
plants in the supply chain, while at the same time ensure
data confidentiality, data integrity and availability (CIA). How-
ever, to increase efficiency and enable agile production, all
information handled by the CPPS has to be trusted. Hence,
the CIA triad needs to be extended towards all the CPPS
processes, including computing, networking and control, so
that not only the stored data within CPPS can be secured and
trusted, but also all the in-transit data. Particularly, to ensure
secured and trusted in-transit data, secure messaging protocols
that take advantage of a root of trust have to be employed for
data exchange. The communication between industrial devices,
IIoT components and cloud services can be achieved in several
ways. The use of messaging systems based on message queues
with the same interface makes possible the communication
through the same interface of devices and applications. The
most popular messaging protocols are reviewed in section
II and a comparison of the architecture, message reliability,
security and performance characteristics of MQTT and CoAP
as leading messaging protocols is presented in table I. To
provide a higher level of security we propose the integration
of TPM as a root of trust for these systems. Implementing
hardware security in existing CPPS is more complicated,
because in facilities different architectures and devices are
applied. These devices might not be able to store certificates or
perform cryptographic calculations; therefore other solutions
have to be applied. TPM is a hardware root of trust, providing
a set of interoperable features used to protect the integrity and
authenticity of embedded devices and systems. The most rel-
evant features in the context of an end-to-end communication
are: the secured key generation and storage and the secured
execution of the cryptographic processes associated with the
keys. In general, the TPM standard, which is specified by the
Trusted Computing Group organization, defines various levels
of security, ranging from hardware-based down to software-
based realizations. However, for industrial applications, where
cyber-attacks could lead to severe financial losses, the usage of
a hardware-based Discrete TPM is recommended, since it also
protects keys and manufacturer certificates during shipping or
transit of CPPS equipment and during regular maintenance by
third-party companies.
A. CPPS End-to-End Communication Use Case
An end-to-end communication use case for an Industry 4.0
application scenario, including the technologies, is illustrated
in Fig 2. By providing these details we can show how the com-
ponents of the use case can be mapped in the corresponding
objects of the CPPS meta-model as illustrated in Fig 1.
Industry plants have a different range of devices (M1, M2,
and M3), including new devices (M3) that already support
secure messaging protocols, such as MQTT and “legacy”
devices( M1 - usually connected via RS-232, RS-485 or USB
interfaces) that need a translator for translating the device
protocol to MQTT. The industrial devices are equipped with
sensors, actuators and communication technology. To collect
Fig. 2. CPPS end-to-end communication use case
the data from these devices the IIoT components, such as
IIoT gateways, are used. In this use case, the IIoT gateway
is build in a Raspberry Pi equipped with macchina.io 12.
Macchina i.o is an open-source toolkit for building embedded
IoT applications and supports different communication proto-
cols, including a MQTT plug-in for enabling the applications
to communicate with various sensors, devices on one side,
and cloud services on the other side. The collected data
are preprocessed from the gateways and sent to the cloud
services for further processing or storage. For a secured
communication between the gateways we propose to use the
MQTT protocol, which also supports the communication from
the IIoT components to the cloud services. All these connected
devices including industrial devices, IIoT components and
cloud services increase the possibility for a potential attack.
To achieve a trustworthy end-to-end communication it is
necessary to provide security for each connected device by
integrating Secure Elements or TPMs in the industrial devices,
IIoT gateways and cloud platforms. One important usage of
the TPM is the secured authentication, using integrated manu-
facturer certificates to check the authenticity of the connected
devices. Furthermore, the TPM can be used for separating the
crucial PKI key generation and RSA or ECDH key exchange
operations into the trust anchor environment. Finally, with the
help of hash and signature features, the TPM can be used to
check the authenticity of firmware and software updates of
connected industrial devices.
B. Measurable Security Indicators
To ensure trusted and secured data exchange we propose
to use intermediary systems to gather the data, such as IIoT
gateways, as described in the use case above. Additionally,
technologies that offer hardware security protection such as
TPM are integrated in the IIoT gateways to provide integrity
protection and a root of trust for the gateways. However, con-
sidering the increasing number of interconnected components,
focusing only on security that addresses CIA is no longer
sufficient. It is very important to consider as well the other
related aspects such as legal and safety. Thus, deriving and
monitoring measurable security metrics related to operational
security, legal (e.g., SLAs) and safety aspects can provide a
higher level of transparency for the entire supply chain.
Following, we show a set of representative example metrics
based on an evaluation of the most relevant standards related
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to operational security, legal, and safety with the aim to
identify MSIs for the CPPS components. For each metric
we give: (i) an ID, respectively MSI (Measurable Security
Indicator), MSSI (Measurable Security SLA Indicator) and
MSFI (Measurable Safety Indicator), (ii) a general description
and (iii) the definition source based on standards and best
practices guidelines.
• MQTT Metrics
[MSI-1] - Secure authentication of clients by server
Source: NIST SP 800-82 [18], ISO 27002 [19],
IEC 62443-3[20]
This property supports confidentiality by assuring that the
client and the server identify each other and assure each other
of their identities. Data exchange without authentication (clear
text) gives the possibility to attackers to easily access and
imply damage or illegal actions on the communication.
[MSI-2] Detecting abnormal behaviours
Source: ISO 27001 [21], ISO 15408 [22]
This property supports integrity by monitoring the client
behaviour to detect potential security incidents (e.g., repeated
authentication attempts).
• IIoT Gateway Metrics
[MSI-3] Secure key/sensitive data storage
Source: NIST SP 800-82 [18], IEC 62443-3[20]
This property supports confidentiality by assuring that keys
are stored within a cryptographic module and encrypted form.
The IIoT gateway needs to gain the trust that the public key
used to verify a signature belongs to the proper client and to
achieve this is required a secure storage of keys.
[MSI-4] Secure Boot
Source: ISO 15408 [22]
This property supports integrity by checking and identifying
if the firmware of each device, operating system and each
software is valid. Without secure boot, attackers can easily
take advantage of several pre-boot points including the system
firmware and running a non-secure operating system.
• Cloud Database Metrics
[MSI-5] Unauthorized data observation
Source: ISO 27001 [21]
This property supports integrity by checking if the system
supports mechanisms to protect the data stored in the database
from unauthorized access or malicious actions in general by
assuring the security of a database.
[MSI-6] Encryption
Source: NIST SP 800-82 [18], ISO 27001 [21],
IEC 62443-3[20]
Encryption supports confidentiality by protecting the data at
rest from internal and external attacks. By protecting the
databases only the authorized user/device with the key can
decrypt these data. This can be applied to data when being
stored on secure storage or transmitted on a network.
As mentioned above, considering only security is not suffi-
cient in a scenario where numerous stakeholders are involved.
For example, to deal with legal and organizational issues
between two different stakeholders contract agreements, such
as SLAs, which include security related metrics should be in
place. It is important to specify security requirements upfront,
but it is even more important to be able to monitor and verify
whether these security requirements are being met throughout
the lifetime of the contract. Further, with the increase of the
complexity and the interconnection of CPPS components it is
of utmost importance to ensure that safety requirements are
identified and addressed as well.
• Security SLA metrics
[MSSI-1] Service availability
Source: ENISA [23], C-SIG [24]
Availability is the property of being accessible and usable upon
demand by an authorized entity. It is an important service
level objective (SLO), which describes when the services can
be operated. Relevant SLOs can be: (i) service uptime, (ii)
percentage of successful requests, (iii) average response time,
(iv) max response time and (v) service reliability.
[MSSI-2] Data Isolation
Source: ENISA [23], C-SIG [24]
Data isolation supports confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity of user data and services between different parties. Relevant
SLOs: (i) user authentication level, (ii) authentication, (iii)
user access storage protection, (iii) cryptographic brute force
resistance, and (iv) key access control policy.
• Safety Metrics
[MSFI-1] Continuous Maintenance
Source: IEC 61508-2 [25]
Inputs from Functional Safety Audits and tests of the E/E/PE
safety-related system shall be used to upgrade system opera-
tion and maintenance procedures
[MSFI-2] Ensure sufficient frequency of maintenance
Source: IEC 61508-2[25]
It shall be ensured that the frequency of routine maintenance
procedures is sufficient to maintain the required functional
safety. A possible approach are regular proof tests.
The above set of representative metrics, based on the
SemI40 project requirements and the evaluated standards is
not a finite set of measurable metrics, but a working set that
will be further extended for each component of the use case.
C. Dependability of the CPPS Components
In the context of this work we use the CPPS meta-model as
a tool to show the dependability between the levels, and the
corresponding components of the end-to-end communication
use case in order to have a security view of the whole system.
By mapping the derived MSIs of the use case components
in the corresponding objects of the meta-model is possible
to identify monitoring points, thus an enhanced level of
transparency can be ensured. If the security of one component
is compromised it can also affect other components of the
CPPS depending directly from that component, or indirectly
from other components depending on that. The dependability
between the CPPS components is shown in Figure 3.
In case one of the MSIs of the IIoT gateway is compro-
mised, for e.g., MSI-3 Secure key/sensitive data storage, from
Fig. 3. CPPS meta-model used as a tool to show the dependability
the meta-model we can identify the other components that can
be affected by this security issue, such as Protocol (e.g., MSI-
1) and Database (e.g., MSI-6). If MSI-3 is not fulfilled, it can
result in for example, sensor data loss. However, as discussed
above security cannot be considered as independent from other
aspects such as legal and safety. Thus, it is important to
consider also MSSIs that are previously agreed in the SLA
in order to prevent legal issues. The SLA metrics are mapped
in the contract/agreement object in the CPPS meta-model. As
future work we will derive and monitor measurable metrics
related to operational security, legal and safety for all the CPPS
components with the main focus to provide a higher level of
transparency when implementing Industry 4.0 applications.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have derived a CPPS meta-model, which
is used as a tool to identify the dependencies among different
CPPS components. Providing a clear view on the dependencies
can help to define monitoring points for the whole system.
To show this we have considered a use case addressing
the communication from the edge devices to the backend
infrastructure via IIoT gateways. To ensure secured and trusted
in-transit data, we have proposed to use secure messaging
protocols that take advantage of a root of trust such as TPM
for secure data exchange. By mapping the MSIs of the CPPS
components in the corresponding objects of the meta-model
it is possible to see the dependability among components in
case of security challenges. Thus, it is possible to provide
a security view of the CPPS system as a whole. As our
future work, we intend to derive operational security, legal
and safety measurable metrics for all the CPPS components
that are part of the proposed use case and define monitoring
points in the CPPS meta-model to assure a trustworthy end-to-
end communication in Industry 4.0. Our research challenges
are mostly not addressed and we believe that future research
in this area can provide an additional level of security for
Industry 4.0.
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